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Abstract
The vast territorial extent of the Achaemenid Empire is often assumed to have impeded 
connectivity and communication within the empire. This paper challenges the validity of 
this assumption. Two factors in particular favor this conclusion—the presence of an exten-
sive road network and the high communication speed in the empire, made possible by the 
pirradazish service. Together, they demonstrate the enormous potential for movement and 
interaction throughout the empire.
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The Obstacle of Distance
The Achaemenid Empire was among the largest empires of the ancient 
world. It covered a land area five times greater than any of its predecessors 
and was matched, later, only by the Xiongnu confederation and the Han 
Dynasty in China. Although its size is frequently commented upon, the 
impact of the empire’s geography on its overall character and its day-to-day 
operations has rarely been articulated. Most scholarship assumes implicitly 
that the empire’s size inhibited connectivity and communication. Robin 
Lane Fox, in his biography of Alexander, went so far to as to write that 
“centralized rule is the victim of time and distance and in an empire where 
a royal letter could take three months to go from Phrygia to the Persian 
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Gulf, power had to be local to avoid dilution by mountains and slow roads” 
(Lane Fox 1973: 96). This remark encapsulates neatly the effects of such 
assumptions: local political autonomy was a necessity, cultural and eco-
nomic interactions were limited, and rebellions were frequent, in the 
absence of strong imperial oversight.
But how valid are these assumptions? The empire’s vast size certainly 
affected movement and communication within the empire, as it did in all 
pre-modern societies, but, as Roger Matthews has asserted, common-sense 
assumptions are rarely the best guide to assessing the relationship between 
Near Eastern empires and geography (Matthews 2003: 143). Rather, these 
assumptions need to be tested or at least subjected to critical scrutiny. 
Here, the study of the Mediterranean world is a useful exemplar because 
of the attention given to its geography by students of its history.2 Two 
studies stand out: Fernand Braudel’s La Méditerranée et le monde mediter-
ranéen à l’époque de Phillippe II (1949), and Peregrine Horden and Nicho-
las Purcell’s book The Corrupting Sea: A Study in Mediterranean History 
(2000). Braudel recognized the problems inherent in the vast extent of the 
sixteenth-century Spanish Empire, noting that “Spain waged an unremit-
ting struggle against the obstacle of distance” (Braudel 1972: 374), but he 
also argued that the geography of the Mediterranean actually facilitated 
connections between different regions, in large part because the practice of 
coastal navigation made it difficult for any place to be bypassed entirely; 
the Mediterranean was thus “scarcely different from a river” (Braudel 
1972: 103-8). Similarly, Horden and Purcell emphasize the “connectiv-
ity” of the Mediterranean (Horden and Purcell 2000: 123-72). This term, 
originally borrowed from graph theory, refers to “the various ways in which 
micro regions cohere, both internally and also with one another – in aggre-
gates that may range in size from small clusters to something approach-
ing the entire Mediterranean” (Horden and Purcell 2000: 123). In the 
Mediterranean the means by which people contended with the challenges 
of geography thus actually created connectivity between distant places, a 
connectivity belied by distance alone. This in turn created the conditions 
necessary to political, economic, and cultural interaction and integration 
across the Mediterranean world.
2) This remark belies the importance of the excellent study by Wilkinson 2003. But, 
although he does address many points relevant to the interaction of geography and empire, 
including movement (60-2), he mentions the Achaemenid Empire only in passing and 
does not consider empires in any broad sense.
 Connectivity and Communication in the Achaemenid Empire 31
This paper uses the Mediterranean as an intellectual paradigm for re-
examining connectivity in the Achaemenid Empire. Although the geogra-
phy of the Near East is essentially the inverse of that of the Mediterranean, 
consisting of high mountains, plateaus, and alluvial floodplains, the means 
by which the challenges presented by this geography were addressed in the 
empire created connectivity in a comparable manner (but note Braudel’s 
[1972: 171-88] likening of the Sahara to the Mediterranean). Two factors 
are particularly suggestive in this respect. The first is the presence of an 
extensive infrastructure of movement that served to connect the far-flung 
places of the empire with each other and with its major centers. This infra-
structure consisted primarily of a network of roads, though rivers, canals, 
and trails also played a significant role. The most famous section of this 
road network is the segment connecting Susa to Sardis, but the Persepolis 
Fortification Archive, a large corpus of administrative texts on clay tablets 
excavated at Persepolis (Briant et al. 2008; Henkelman 2008a: 65-179; 
Hallock 1969), indicates that the network extended north, to Hyrcania 
and Parthia, and east, to Kandahar, India, and Bactra. Moreover, archaeo-
logical fieldwork of various kinds is increasingly elucidating the routes and 
character of these roads and the facilities that supported their use. Even 
though it promoted a different form of connectivity, this infrastructure can 
be regarded as a sort of functional equivalent to the Mediterranean Sea. 
This comparison is even more apt, given the riverine nature of the Medi-
terranean resulting from coastal navigation: coasts, like rivers and roads, 
are linear and interconnect the places along them. Secondly, the pirradazish 
service, a postal relay system, served to connect the various parts of the 
empire to each other by means of high-speed communication. By using 
comparative data from a similar institution, the American Pony Express, 
the actual speed of communication in the Achaemenid Empire can be 
estimated. When compared to the speed of communication in the Roman 
Empire, whose parts are traditionally regarded as having been intercon-
nected by the Mediterranean, this estimate is especially suggestive of a high 
level of connectivity in the Achaemenid Empire.
The Infrastructure of Movement
The most basic prerequisite for connectivity in premodern empires is an 
infrastructure of movement. As Braudel put it, “The Mediterranean has 
no unity but that created by the movements of men, the relationships they 
imply, and the routes they follow” (Braudel 1972: 276). This infrastructure 
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typically consists of a network of roads, rivers, and canals for overland 
travel, and a series of ports and anchorages for seaborne travel. Given the 
geography of the Achaemenid Empire, travel by road presumably played a 
more prominent role than seaborne movement. Certainly it is better under-
stood, although future research may demonstrate that water routes, such as 
Darius’s canal connecting the Nile to the Red Sea, operated in a manner 
comparable to the roads and were important in their own right (for a pre-
liminary discussion see Cataudella 2002). By their very presence these roads 
created the potential for connectivity within the empire. Though overland 
travel in antiquity is generally characterized as slow, inefficient, and costly, 
the actual data for the potential for movement are more encouraging. One 
particularly important study uses ethnographic data on Nepali porters to 
challenge the traditionally perceived limitations on the transportation of 
bulk goods by lands (Malville 2001). These findings suggest that human 
porters can move loads of sixty to one hundred kilograms a distance of ten 
to fifteen kilometers per day without the benefit of roads. This may not be 
the most efficient means of long-distance transport, but it demonstrates 
the potential for overland movement on a smaller scale. Moreover, the use 
of pack animals dramatically increases both distance and carrying capacity. 
Mules, for example, can carry loads of 150-180 kilograms up to twenty-
four kilometers per day, and lighter loads of seventy to eighty kilograms as 
far as thirty to forty-eight kilometers per day. Likewise, camels are known 
to carry much heavier loads, up to 300 kilograms, some thirty kilometers 
per day (Raepsaet 2008, 589). These figures do not take into account the 
transportation of fodder, and they pertain to the movement of freight rather 
than that of people, but they still demonstrate the potential for the overland 
movement of goods, people and ideas over great distances.
In the Achaemenid Empire the network of roads is typically referred to 
by the term “royal road,” on account of Herodotus’s reference (5.52) to 
“royal stations” along one well known segment of it, and by analogy with 
the Neo-Assyrian royal roads and the kings’ highways of more recent Euro-
pean history. This network has been studied several times in the past, 
though generally with a focus on reconstructing the major routes (e.g., 
Graf 1994; Briant 2002: 357-64; 2012; Seibert 2002). But this is only one 
component of the network, and this study will consider not only the routes 
themselves but also the network’s overall extent and the conditions that 
prevailed along it. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that, 
despite the empire’s large size, its infrastructure facilitated the movement 
of people, goods, and ideas to even its remotest reaches, thereby creating 
the potential for connectivity.
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Extent. The evidence for the extent and nature of the road network 
comes from references in Elamite and Aramaic documents and Greek 
authors and from archaeological fieldwork. The Persepolis Fortification 
Archive (Briant et al. 2008; Henkelman 2008a: 65-179; Hallock 1969), 
especially, provides evidence for the imperial road system in several ways. 
Most notably, the texts recording the disbursement of travel rations (desig-
nated ‘Q’ texts by Hallock) often refer to the travelers’ destinations or 
points of origin, and many of these places are far beyond the local area of 
Persepolis and Susa. A single ‘journal’ text (PF 1953), in which annual 
disbursements were tabulated, also refers to a trip made from Arachosia to 
Susa. These origins and destinations are summarized in Table 1 below (see 
also Giovinazzo 1994; Seibert 2002).3
Many of the locations that appear in the Persepolis Archive are in the east-
ern empire, demonstrating the regularity of communication between these 
places and the imperial court. This communication is further evidenced by 
an Elamite tablet discovered at Kandahar, which is much like those from 
Persepolis (Helms 1997: 101; Kuhrt 2007: 814-15). Additionally, the Ara-
maic tablets in the archive also refer to travel between Persepolis, Babylon, 
and Bactria (Azzoni 2008: 260-1), and one document from the Arsham cor-
respondence (TADAE A6.9) is an authorization from Arsham for his subor-
dinate Nehtihor to draw rations on a trip from Susa (presumably) to Egypt.
Routes. The actual routes of these roads can be gleaned in various ways, 
but none is comprehensive, and most rely on assumptions of continuity 
with earlier or later periods (Graf 1994). This is not inherently problematic, 
because pre-industrial land routes tend to remain stable over long periods of 
time. Braudel, for example, considered the study of land (and sea) routes 
part of the history of “man in his relationship to the environment, a history 
in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, ever-recurring 
cycles” (1972: 20, 276-95; also Astour 1995: 1401). This assumption also 
makes the routes in question somewhat predictable, but it does not mean 
that every known major route was an Achaemenid royal road.
A few routes are attested in texts. Though some of the toponyms cannot 
be identified, the document carried by Nehtihor (TADAE A6.9) authoriz-
ing him to draw rations provides some idea of the route he took (see Graf 
1994: 179 for the places mentioned). The journey probably began in Susa 
and went north and west via Lahiru (on the border of Elam), Arzuhin 
(south of the Lower Zab), Arbela, Hazza (southeast of Nineveh), and Ubasie 
(north of Ashur), and then southwest to Damascus, whence it presumably 
3) I am especially grateful to Wouter Henkelman for information from unpublished tablets.
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Table 1: Origins and destinations of trips referred to in Q and V texts 
from the Persepolis Fortification Archive
Origin or Destination Tablet
Arachosia PF 1351, 1385, 1439, 1443, 1474, 1484, 
1510, 1953, 2049, PFNN 0257, 0881, 1761, 
1898, 2062, 2503
Areia PF 1361, 1438, 1540, 2056, PFa 29, PFNN 
1713
Assyria PF 1574, PFNN 0515
Babylon PF 1512, PFNN 0534
Bactria PF 1555, PFNN 1507
Drangiana PFNN 0690, 0827, 2096
Ecbatana PFNN 2502
Egypt PF 1544
Hyrcania PFNN 2512
India PF 1318, 1383, 1397, 1524, 1525, 1552, 
1556, 1558, 1572, 2057, PFNN 0246, 0317, 
1458, 1571, 2323, 2584
Kandahar PF 1358, 1440, 1550, PFNN 0534, 1573, 
2383
Kerman 1289, 1330, 1332, 1348, 1377, 1398, 1399, 
1436, 1466, PFa 14, PFNN 0445, 0498, 
0615, 0626, 0692, 0765, 0801, 0809, 0820, 
0946, 1044, 1081, 1580, 1585, 1621, 1662, 
1864, 2139, 2259, 2261, 2543
Lebanon PFNN 1609, 1631
Media PF 1480, PFa 31, PFNN 2261
Parthia PFNN 1657
Sagartia PF 1501, PFa 31, PFNN 2040, 2261
Sardis PF 1321, 1404, PFNN 0901, 1809
continued to Egypt. And there is Herodotus’s (5.52-4) well known descrip-
tion of the Susa-Sardis road, according to which the road went from Susa 
through the Zagros Mountains, north along the plains east of the Tigris 
into Cissia and Armenia, then west through Cilicia, Cappadocia, and Phry-
gia to Sardis. This much is straightforward enough, but Herodotus specifies 
that the route crossed the Halys River and went through the Cilician Gates, 
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which has struck some commentators as unnecessarily circuitous. Like-
wise, the distances he provides cannot easily be made to match the route, 
and various alternative routes have accordingly been proposed to account 
for this discrepancy (Graf 1994: 175-80; French 1998; Debord 1995; 
Müller 1994; Lendle 1987). It suffices to point out that this road did not 
exist solely to link Susa to Sardis. Rather, it was part of the larger network 
of roads, and a route that may be circuitous if one is traveling from Sardis 
to Susa is not necessarily so if one is attempting to reach a place between 
them. The centrality of this road for the Greeks belies the importance, or 
even the preeminence, of the empire’s eastern routes, as illustrated by the 
Persepolis Fortification Archive.
Other classical authors also provide evidence for the routes of these 
roads. Xenophon’s description of the route taken by the army of Cyrus the 
Younger (Anabasis 1.2.5-7.1) is often taken as evidence for a southerly 
royal road through Anatolia. The passages in Arrian (fl. second century 
CE) and Curtius (fl. first century CE) that discuss the movements of Alex-
ander’s army are used in the same way. Although these writers do not refer 
explicitly to royal roads, their work suggests the extent of the empire’s road 
network, because these armies generally followed pre-existing routes such 
as roads or rivers. Isidore of Charax (fl. first century BCE–first century 
CE) wrote a now fragmentary work entitled Parthian Stations, an itinerary 
of the overland route from Antioch to India (FGrH 781). This work was 
probably written sometime after 26 BCE and refers to conditions in the 
Parthian rather than the Achaemenid Empire, but the route (and perhaps 
the system of stations) was probably in use in Achaemenid times. These 
sources suggest that the eastern empire was accessible via a southerly route 
from Persepolis to the Indus river valley and a northerly route from Ecba-
tana through Hyrcania to Bactra and Kandahar, and this is borne out by 
the Persepolis Fortification Archive. And the itineraries from earlier peri-
ods suggest that Mesopotamia was crisscrossed by routes throughout its 
history, although it is difficult in some cases to distinguish between travel 
by road and travel by river (Astour 1995).
Textual sources of this sort, usually in conjunction with topographical 
knowledge, have traditionally been the main evidence for the routes of the 
royal road system, but in recent years archaeological fieldwork has also 
begun to provide complementary evidence of various kinds. For example, 
the roads in Palestine have been reconstructed on the basis of the settle-
ment pattern (Roll and Tal 2008). This approach assumes that the major 
sites were connected to each other by roads and that roads of particular 
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importance were protected and controlled by forts. This approach is pos-
sible in Palestine because of the relative comprehensiveness of archaeo-
logical fieldwork there and the comparatively small size of the region. The 
period of Achaemenid rule is especially well understood in Palestine in 
archaeological terms, which in turn facilitates reconstruction of settlement 
patterns. Unfortunately the utility of this approach is limited for larger 
areas with less archaeological coverage and where the Achaemenid period 
is still not well understood archaeologically. Another approach is the iden-
tification of sites of comparable size and consistent spacing over a linear 
distribution, as has been done in two surveys in southwestern Iran, one on 
the Deh Luran plain and the other in the Mamasani District (Wright and 
Neely 2010: 112; Askari Chaverdi et al. 2010: 294). These sites have been 
interpreted as stations along the royal road, partly because their size and 
spacing do not fit with the observed settlement patterns. The designs of 
these surveys are informed in part by the expectation that there were sta-
tions in these areas, but this does not invalidate the proposed interpreta-
tion of these sites. Another technique is the use of satellite photographs to 
identify “hollow ways,” that is, shallow linear depressions created by repet-
itive movement along them. These hollow ways result from both the move-
ment of farmers and herdsmen between villages and fields and traffic on 
trans-regional roads. In this latter context, they have been used to recon-
struct some of the roads of the Neo-Assyrian empire in northern Mesopo-
tamia, which were previously best understood through textual evidence 
(Wilkinson et al. 2005, 32-7). These roads remained in use under Achae-
menid rule; indeed, the route taken by Nehtihor through northern Meso-
potamia follows what must have been a Neo-Assyrian road. Finally, the 
Darb Rayayna, a road between Armant in the Qena Bend in Upper Egypt 
and the Kharga Oasis in the Western Desert, shows signs of use under 
Achaemenid rule, in the form of demotic and hieroglyphic graffiti at 
Armant dating to the eighteenth year of the reign (522-486 BCE) of 
Darius I (Di Cerbo and Jasnow 1996). Further epigraphic research and 
analysis of the ceramic sherds littering the desert roads may elucidate the 
route network in Egypt.
Conditions. Although the roads were probably largely unpaved, there are 
some indications to the contrary. Two stretches of stone pavement have 
been identified as possible segments of the Persepolis-Susa road, a 7-meter-
wide cobblestone section, and a 5-meter section of flagstones with curb 
(Sumner 1986: 17). Neither can be dated definitively, although sherds 
from the Achaemenid period were found at several places on the former 
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segment. This suggests that the royal roads may have been partly paved, 
although such pavement may have been limited to the vicinities of cities or 
to the most important arteries, such as the Persepolis-Susa road. The latter 
would have been an important route for the movement of the Great King 
and the imperial court, and recent excavations of what had previously been 
identified as a station at Qaleh Kali suggest that the structures there were 
more monumental than would be expected for a mere way station (Potts 
et al. 2007; 2009; there is also some question as to how far off the road 
these structures are). This road may thus have served as a processional 
route, or perhaps its frequent use by important travelers simply necessi-
tated better road conditions and facilities, but, in either case, such pave-
ment was probably not typical of the road system. The ancient road cleared 
at Gordion is probably a better indication of the typical road. This segment 
of road was approximately 6.25 meters wide, with a packed gravel surface 
and curbstones and a ridge down the middle dividing the road into two 
lanes (Graf 1994: 177; Young 1963: 348-9, fig. 2).4 The road avoids and 
therefore postdates the Middle Phrygian tumuli, and excavations have 
turned up sherds from the late sixth century BCE, suggesting that it was 
constructed during the Achaemenid period. Proximity to Gordion might 
have caused this road to receive more attention than those in more rural 
parts of the empire, and it is possible that improvements were added in the 
Roman period, but there is no reason to suppose that this sort of road was 
beyond the technological or administrative abilities of the Achaemenids. 
Finally, a segment of rock-cut road at Madakeh has also been associated 
with the Persepolis-Susa road (Kleiss 1981: 48-51). Many rock-cut irriga-
tion channels are known from this region in Iran, but the width (5 m) and 
location of this particular feature are consistent with its being part of the 
road (see also Sumner 1986: 17). The cutting of this segment would cer-
tainly have been enormously labor intensive, and its construction demon-
strates Achaemenid investment in road building.
In addition to the roads themselves, there are some indications of the 
facilities and maintenance of the road network. Of particular importance 
are the way stations, although evidence for them is limited. Many of the 
toponyms appearing in the Fortification Archive probably name the sites 
of way stations, but their identification remains uncertain (Potts 2008). 
4) According to Miller (1997: 115 n. 34), citing a personal communication from Keith 
DeVries, the interpretation of this segment of road as the royal road has been dropped. No 
reasons are provided for this change.
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Only a handful (all in Iran) have been identified archaeologically, and most 
of these have been subject to only cursory investigation. These include two 
stations near Germabad and at Madakeh on the Persepolis-Susa road 
(Kleiss 1981), one at Tang-i Bulaghi near Pasargadae (Asadi and Kaim 
2009: 1-11), and one at Deh Bozan between Susa and Ecabatana (Mousavi 
1989). But their remains are still suggestive. For example, the recently 
excavated building at site 64 in Tang-i Bulaghi (near Pasargadae) consists 
of a courtyard surrounded by thick walls, with several smaller rooms 
adjoining it. This description fits several different known types of ancient 
buildings, but it is at least broadly consistent with the characteristics of 
ancient caravanserais recently defined by Yifat Thareani-Sussely (2007: 123-
6). The station near Madakeh is also comparable to the Tang-i Bulaghi build-
ing and to Thareani-Sussely’s model. This proves nothing, but it does not 
disprove the assumptions typically made in the scholarly literature about the 
nature of these stations, namely, that they combined the functions of cara-
vanserais, guard posts, and supply depots. This is also consistent with their 
possible use by the imperial mail service, as the spacing of the stations an 
average of twenty-four kilometers apart (per Herodotus’s description of the 
road) made them suitable to both the rapid exchange of horses by mounted 
couriers and overnight use by slower travelers. Xenophon (Cyropaedia 
8.6.17) uses the term hippōn (“of horses”) to refer to the stations, implying 
the presence of stables. Moreover, the travel documents from Persepolis 
and TADAE A6.9 demonstrate the function of these stations as supply 
depots for official travelers (Briant 2012), as do the Aramaic documents 
from Tel Arad, in southern Palestine (Naveh 1981), and from Khulmi in 
Bactria (Briant 2009: 149), which refer to the disbursement of rations to 
travelers. In addition to the excavated stations there is another, also on the 
Persepolis-Susa road, which is currently the subject of more exhaustive 
archaeological study. This is the station at Qaleh Kali, near Jinjun, in the 
Mamasani District in Fars (Potts et al. 2007, 2009). The excavation con-
tinues, but the preliminary results suggest more than a caravanserai or 
stable. The building has been described by the excavators as a portico, 
including a stone floor, column bases, short staircases, and some associated 
mud-brick remains. The elaborate nature of the column bases and the 
presence of delicate glass and fine stone tablewares are especially suggestive 
that this facility catered to a more exclusive clientele than did the typical 
station. This may have been the result of Qaleh Kali’s location along—or 
at least not far from—the Persepolis-Susa road, which was one of the major 
arteries of the empire, especially for royal and court traffic (Tuplin 1998).
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The Persepolis Fortification Archive also provides limited evidence for 
the maintenance of the roads. Several texts (e.g., PFa 15, 21, 30, 31) refer 
to “road counters” or to people who have “computed the road” (e.g., PFa 
19, 22, 30). The precise natures of these people and activities are not yet 
clear, but educated guesses can be made. PFa 30 is particularly illustrative: 
lines 8-10 refer to how, in 502 BCE, one Ambadush and his four compan-
ions, who are identified as road counters, waited six days for Darius at a 
place called Hadaran after having computed the Ramitepe road. The impli-
cation of this and of the gangs of workers that sometimes accompany these 
road counters is that their responsibilities were not just to provide accurate 
measurements for the roads, as their name implies, but also to ensure their 
good repair (Hallock 1978: 114-15; Tuplin 1997: 406-9; cf. Aelian, De 
natura animalium 15.26, in which the Great King orders the road from 
Susa to Media cleared of scorpions). The evidence from Persepolis can be 
applied directly only to its administrative remit, which would have included 
much of Fars (Henkelman 2008a: 110-8), but it is not unreasonable to 
think that similar officials existed throughout the empire. The mislead-
ingly precise and frequently inaccurate distances cited by Herodotus and 
Xenophon, for the Susa-Sardis road and the route taken by the army of 
Cyrus the Younger respectively, might be evidence for this, if, as has often 
been suggested, they made use of maps, itineraries, or, in Xenophon’s case, 
milestones (Tuplin 1997: 404-9; Rood 2010). Indeed, according to Pho-
tius’s epitome (ninth century CE), Ctesias provided a “calculation of the 
staging-posts, and distances in day-journeys and parasangs from Ephesus 
to Bactra and India” (FGrH 688 F33; trans. J. Robson). At any rate, it 
would certainly not be surprising for a land empire to invest in the main-
tenance of its roads.
The impression gained from the material presented above is of an empire 
connected by means of a network of roads, with Persepolis and Susa as 
major hubs (Figure 1). Although the actual routes of these roads are not 
always known, especially in the eastern half of the empire, their existence 
is not in question, and the Achaemenids clearly invested in their construc-
tion and maintenance, thus creating conditions conducive to movement 
and connectivity. There is nothing to suggest that a journey along the roads 
was necessarily slow and cumbersome, as some scholars have supposed 
(e.g., Miller 1997: 114-17). This undermines the notion of an empire con-
sisting of spatially disconnected parts; this infrastructure actually created 
opportunities for political, economic, and cultural interaction. The case of 
Tamukkan (Taoce) is particularly illustrative of the latter. References in the 
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Persepolis Fortification Archive show that between 502 and 498 BCE this 
coastal town on the Bushehr peninsula was visited by large groups of 
workers. The ethnonyms that refer to these workers indicate that they 
came from all over the empire: Skudrians (i.e., Thracians), Egyptians, 
Lycians, Bactrians, and Cappadocians (Henkelman 2008b: 308-9). Their 
movement throughout the empire was facilitated by the road network and 
its associated infrastructure: the tablets in which these workers appear 
record the rations they drew while traveling to or from Tamukkan. In this 
five-year period Tamukkan must have been a hotbed of cultural exchange, 
as the workers in these groups interacted with each other and with the 
Persians living and working there. That the results of this interaction are 
not evident in the archaeological record is presumably a result of lack of 
preservation or excavation, but the case of Tamukkan does show how 
instrumental the empire’s infrastructure of movement could be in creating 
the conditions necessary for connectivity.
Communication Speed
As Braudel understood, pre-modern communication speed can be used as 
a proxy for connectivity. This is because, before the advent of the telegraph, 
the primary mode of transmitting news and information across long dis-
tances was the transport of written documents by couriers (and others). 
The delay between the sending and the receipt of a letter, for example, can 
indicate how well its carrier overcame the challenges presented by the 
geography of the landscape he had to traverse (Braudel 1972: 355-74). 
Historians of Rome have employed similar methods for antiquity, employ-
ing in particular the speed with which the emperor’s name was replaced in 
the dating formulas in Egyptian documents by that of his successor as a 
gauge of how swiftly news traveled to Egypt from various parts of the 
empire (Duncan-Jones 1990: 7-29; Kolb 2000). This attests not only to 
the speed and frequency of travel but also the efficiency of the mechanisms 
in place to facilitate it. For the Achaemenid Empire, however, the standard 
assumption, informed by ideas about the disconnected nature of the 
empire and the slow speed of overland travel, is that communication was 
inherently and unavoidably slow.
This notion owes its origin to the Greeks, especially to Herodotus. In his 
description of the royal road and in the passage preceding it (5.50, 53), in 
which Aristagoras of Miletus attempts to convince King Cleomenes of 
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Sparta to lend aid to the Ionian revolt, he states that the journey from 
Sardis to Susa took three months. This may have been true under certain 
conditions, especially in the case of an army advancing through hostile 
territory, which is the context in which Herodotus makes these remarks, 
and it has been argued that one of Herodotus’ purposes in this passage is 
to emphasize the potential difficulty of invading the Achaemenid Empire 
(Pelling 2007: 195-6). The trip could, perhaps, actually be completed in 
much less time, and probably usually was. Xenophon, for example (Agesi-
laus 1.10), refers to the same trip taking half the time. The issue here is that 
Susa and the rest of the empire were, for the Greeks, very distant, and this 
is what informed their remarks about communication speed. Because 
communication speed, like much of Achaemenid history, has often been 
approached from a Greek standpoint, this impression has continued to 
shape modern scholarship on the subject.
The question, then, is how to measure communication speed in the 
empire without having to rely on incidental statements in Greek authors 
whose purposes are at variance with this research goal. Braudel used letters 
as a means of measuring communication speed; unfortunately the extant 
letters from the Achaemenid period are not dated as closely as their six-
teenth-century European counterparts. The method used by historians of 
Rome (i.e., noting delays in changing Egyptian dating formulas to reflect 
the accession of a new emperor) is theoretically possible because of the 
existence of exact-day dating in the Achaemenid Empire, but there is evi-
dence only for Artaxerxes I’s succession to the throne after the death of 
Xerxes in 465 BCE, and then only in a single document (references in 
Depuydt 2008: 9).5 The data are thus inadequate for determining an over-
all pattern of communication speed.
This situation can be improved by the use of a comparative approach in 
order to make greater use of the limited evidence available for the empire. 
Such an approach is possible because of the similarities between the pir-
radazish service, the system of couriers that served as the swiftest terrestrial 
form of communication in the empire (Silverstein 2007: 9-28; Briant 
2002: 369-70), and the Pony Express, a postal service that operated in 
5) This document (TADAE B2.2) suggests that it took four months for news of Xerxes’ 
death to reach Upper Egypt. An Idumaean ostracon bears a date of 1 Sivan, first year of 
Philip III (i.e., 17 June 323 BCE), showing that news of Alexander’s death at Babylon on 
June 11 reached southern Palestine within a week (Porten and Yardeni 2003, 213). These 
wildly divergent figures demonstrate the frailty of this evidence for gauging communica-
tion speed, especially given the limited data.
 Connectivity and Communication in the Achaemenid Empire 43
the American West in the nineteenth century. Herodotus (8.98, trans. 
R. Waterfield) describes the pirradazish service:
There is nothing mortal that is faster than the system that the Persians have devised for 
sending messages. Apparently, they have horses and men posted at intervals along the 
route, the same number in total as the overall length in days of the journey, with a 
fresh horse and rider for every day of travel. Whatever the conditions—it may be 
snowing, raining, blazing hot, or dark—they never fail to complete their assigned 
journey in the fastest possible time. The first man passes his instructions on to the 
second, the second to the third, and so on.
Xenophon (Cyropaedia 8.6.17-18) provides a similar description of its 
operation. The service is called angarēion in Greek, the exact meaning and 
origin of which are obscure (Pontillo 1996). It has been associated with the 
unattested Old Iranian term *fratačiš, which occurs in the Persepolis For-
tification Archive in Elamite as pirradazish and which is translated as 
“express runner” or “fast messenger” (Hallock 1969: 42; Tavernier 2007: 
421; Henkelman 2008a: 199-200 n. 428; Seibert 2002: 32-5). References 
to pirradazish horses and the rations issued to them indicate that these 
express runners were probably mounted couriers (Gabrielli 2006: 49-50). 
Relay systems of mounted couriers have existed throughout the Old World 
since at least the fifth century BCE (Silverstein 2007; Gazagnadou 1994), 
but the best data for the speed of such a system are for the Pony Express, 
which operated between St. Joseph, Missouri, and Sacramento, California, 
in the American West, from 1860 to 1861. The similarity between the pir-
radazish service as Herodotus and Xenophon describe it and the Pony 
Express has often been noted, and this similarity, as well as the availability 
of data, makes the Pony Express a good subject for comparison with the 
Achaemenid pirradazish service.6 Such a comparison relies on assumptions 
that cannot easily be proven and that are made for the purposes of simpli-
fication. They are made explicit below for the sake of methodological 
transparency.
The route used by these couriers was the royal road system. This is a reason-
able assumption, for which there is some evidence. Most important is the 
6) The barīd, the imperial postal system used by many premodern Middle Eastern Islamic 
empires, although closer in time and space to the pirradazish service, is less suitable for 
comparison, because the data for the speed with which it operated are generally derived 
from literary references to specific trips rather than actual records of the postal system itself. 
In general, see Silverstein 2007.
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evidence for the stations along the roads, which would have facilitated the 
changing of horses and riders. Also, a tablet from the Persepolis Fortifica-
tion Archive (PFNN 1809; Lewis 1997: 342-4) recording the issuance of 
rations to a man named Datiya on a trip from Sardis to Persepolis labels 
him as a pirradazish, which may indicate that he was authorized to use the 
horses and stations of the imperial mail service for his journey. Four other 
men similarly labeled are also recorded as drawing rations for a trip to 
Sardis (PF 1321), and individuals identified in this way appear in sixteen 
other tablets, usually on their way to or from the king.7
The route described by Herodotus is accurate. This assumption is more 
problematic, and several alternatives to the route described by Herodotus 
have been proposed (Graf 1994: 175-80; French 1998; Debord 1995; 
Müller 1994; Lendle 1987). For the purposes of this study, however, the 
issue is moot, because the approximate distances of the two main alterna-
tives vary by less than 300 kilometers; it will be shown below that this dif-
ference is not significant. For the sake of argument, I assume that the route 
described by Herodotus is accurate and, accordingly, use the length of that 
route for my calculations. This assumption sidesteps several other thorny 
issues as well, such as the nature and length of the units of measure used by 
Herodotus and his sources for this information.
The horses used for the pirradazish service could travel at speeds comparable 
to those used in the Pony Express. Evidence for the types of horses used by 
the pirradazish service is limited. Osteological study of horse remains from 
sites in Iran suggests an average height of 125-30 centimeters at the with-
ers, which would, by modern standards, make these horses ponies (Gabri-
elli 2006: 5-10; but see 61-2 for the hypothesis that pirradazish horses were 
generally 135-7 cm tall). The Pony Express used a variety of horses, most 
of which were mustangs and some of which may have been ponies (Cor-
bett 2003: 84-6). It is likely, however, that the best horses available were 
procured in both cases. Indeed, in the Persepolis Fortification Archive 
there are references to horses specifically identified as being for the pir-
radazish service, suggesting both careful selection and high standards 
(Gabrielli 2006: 49-50; the tablets are PF 1672, 1700, 2061, 2062, 2065, 
PFNN 0228, 0642, 1232; cf. Esther 8:10). Likewise, frequent references 
in ancient authors to the quality of “Nisaean horses,” named for the plain 
7) These are PF 1285, 1315, 1319, 1320, 1329, 1334, 1335, 2052, PFNN 0916, 0570, 
1271, 1325, 1950, 2063, 2261, 2424, and 3051.
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in Iran where they were bred, further indicate that the fastest horses were 
available to the pirradazish service (Gabrielli 2006: 17-34).
The riders in the pirradazish service changed horses at every station. This 
assumption contradicts Herodotus (8.98), who says that the horses and 
riders changed at every station, which were each spaced a day’s ride apart. 
But, according to his description of the royal road, the average distance 
between stations is approximately twenty-four kilometers, and a person 
could cover this distance on foot in a single day, and a horse could do so in 
slightly more than an hour. This distance is borne out by the stations iden-
tified in archaeological surveys in Mamasani and the Deh Luran plain in 
southwestern Iran. These stations are generally closer together than this, 
about seventeen to eighteen kilometers apart, but this is not highly incon-
gruent with Herodotus’s description of the road and may simply reflect an 
increased administrative presence due to proximity to the imperial capitals 
(Askari Chaverdi et al. 2010: 294; Wright and Neely 2010: 112). The sta-
tions were thus clearly not a full day’s ride apart. Moreover, veterinary 
research suggests that this spacing of stations was conducive to the long-
term health of the horses (Minetti 2003). Indeed, in the various postal 
relay systems for which there is sufficient data, the spacing of stations was 
typically between sixteen and twenty-five kilometers, and in the Pony 
Express approximately twenty kilometers (Minetti 2003; Frajola et al. 
2005: 161-5). Xenophon even states that Cyrus “experimented to find out 
how great a distance a horse could cover in a day when ridden hard but so 
as not to break down, and then he erected post-stations at just such dis-
tances” (Cyropaedia 8.6.17; trans. W. Miller). Finally, although the travel 
rations mentioned in the Persepolis Fortification Archive were generally 
issued on a daily basis, including to the pirradazish service, the horses were 
not necessarily changed only once a day, because horses and riders presum-
ably drew rations only from the station at which they stopped for the day 
(Hallock 1969: 6). All of these factors support the assumption of this 
paper, that riders changed horses at every station rather than daily, not-
withstanding Herodotus’s statement.
All these assumptions might make one balk at the tenuousness of the 
following comparison, but the overall difference between the pirradazish 
service and the Pony Express is not great; these assumptions have been laid 
out not to undermine the comparison but to demonstrate what has been 
simplified for the sake of argument. We can consider the communication 
speed of the Pony Express to be a maximum, which the pirradazish service 
would have been unlikely to exceed, especially without stirrups. This is still 
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a useful exercise for the purposes of this study, because the objective is to 
gauge how the geographic dynamics of the empire affected its operation.
The actual comparison is straightforward. There are travel times known 
for 104 eastbound Pony Express trips, the fastest being nine days, and the 
slowest thirty-one (on account of interference by Native Americans), giv-
ing an average of 13.2 days to complete the trip (Frajola et al. 2005: 
86-91).8 In general, though, the delays were probably not as great as in the 
American West. Likewise, there are travel times known for 140 westbound 
trips, the fastest again being nine days and the slowest thirty-six (also 
delayed on account of Native Americans), for an average of 12.5 days to 
complete the trip (Frajola et al. 2005: 94-9). The overall average is thus 
12.9 days. The route of the Pony Express was a total of 2964 kilometers, so 
the riders traversed an average of 230 kilometers per day (Frajola et al. 
2005: 161-5). Using the total length of 2673 kilometers for the royal road 
from Sardis to Susa, the trip could be made by the pirradazish service in 
11.6 days, or probably a little longer given the lack of stirrups and horse-
shoes. Persepolis, just over 500 kilometers from Susa, could be reached in 
an additional 2.2 days at the same speed. Likewise, if it is roughly 2762 
kilometers (by my own measurement) from Persepolis to Memphis, the 
satrapal capital in northern Egypt, the journey could be made by the pir-
radazish service in 12.0 days at the same speed.
This estimate for communication speed in the empire is not revolution-
ary; a century ago Riepl provided a similar estimate of eight to ten days to 
reach Susa from Sardis (Riepl 1913: 194), but this estimate and the many 
subsequent ones that range between one and two weeks for this same jour-
ney have no explicit bases, meaning that it has hitherto been impossible to 
decide which estimate is the most accurate. The estimate presented in this 
paper at least provides grounds for its acceptance or rejection that are 
methodologically more robust. Its appropriateness as an indicator of the 
speed of the pirradazish service is supported by the limited data for the 
speed of the barīd, the imperial postal system used by many of the pre-
modern Islamic empires in the Middle East. The barīd operated in a man-
ner similar to both the pirradazish service and the Pony Express, and the 
extant recorded speeds for it are, on the whole, consistent with the speed 
8) I include outliers in the data which were caused by Native American interference because 
it is not unreasonable to assume that similar delays occurred in the Achaemenid Empire, as 
the entire territory of the empire was not consistently under Achaemenid control, e.g., in 
the Zagros Mountains, for which see Briant 2002: 726-33.
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of 230 kilometers per day proposed for the Achaemenid Empire (Silver-
stein 2007: 193). The barīd and the pirradazish service operated in the 
same geographic setting and, in many cases, along the same routes, making 
this estimate still more plausible.
This estimate for Achaemenid communication speed represents a maxi-
mum for the speed of movement in the empire. The overwhelming major-
ity of movement would have been much slower, because it would have 
consisted of freight, porters, elite travelers, work crews, and armies, but the 
fact that people and information could move this swiftly throughout the 
empire is indicative of connectivity, as events in one part of the empire 
could have a swift effect elsewhere. For example, the preparations made by 
Artaxerxes II in response to the revolt of Cyrus the Younger (whom Artax-
erxes defeated and killed in 401 BCE), including the mustering of a large 
army at Ecbatana, were made possible by the empire’s connectivity (Briant 
2002: 629). Likewise, goods and ideas could circulate all over the Near 
East and beyond.
Comparisons and Implications
If connectivity results from the means by which people overcome the chal-
lenges presented by geography, it is unreasonable to assume that connec-
tivity was low in the Achaemenid Empire. This much is suggested by the 
two factors elucidated in this paper: first, the creation of an infrastructure 
of movement consisting of an extensive road network that linked places as 
distant as Kandahar and Memphis and facilitated the movement of people, 
goods, and ideas throughout the empire; and second, the speed at which 
the pirradazish service probably operated indicates that, under optimal 
conditions, the great distances between the various parts of the empire 
were not impediments to the timely exchange of important information. 
The combination of these two factors indicates strongly that there was a 
higher level of connectivity in the empire than has typically been assumed, 
despite the fact that it had no Mediterranean at its center. Even though the 
actual effects of this connectivity are not always visible archaeologically, 
the symbolic integrative function of roads, mounted couriers, or even 
products with distinctly imperial associations cannot be underestimated. 
For example, the knowledge that Persepolis or Susa lay at the other end of 
a road might have been a powerful unifying force in the creation of an 
imperial identity (Earle 1991).
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The actual degree of connectivity in the empire is best brought out by a 
comparison with the Mediterranean, and, in particular, with the Roman 
Empire. Both empires had infrastructures of movement that connected 
their most central places with their most remote. These infrastructures are 
difficult to compare because of the geographic differences between the 
Near East and the Mediterranean, but there are some notable similarities, 
such as the networks of roads maintained by the empires. A more interest-
ing comparison, however, is that of communication speed, because this 
can provide a sense of how successful the Achaemenids and the Romans 
were in overcoming the challenges inherent in the geographies of their 
respective empires. The time elapsed between the death of an emperor in 
Italy and the use of his successor’s name in the dating formulas in Egyptian 
documents averages fifty-seven days (Duncan-Jones 1990: 15). This figure 
is increased by seasonal variation, as the Mediterranean was generally 
unnavigable in winter, but, even in summer, thirty days is considered swift 
for this journey (Duncan-Jones 1990: 26). This is equivalent to sixty-two 
kilometers per day, nearly four times slower than the estimate for the 
Achaemenid Empire. Communication on land by means of the imperial 
postal service (the cursus publicus) was generally faster but still only aver-
aged about seventy-five kilometers per day (Kolb 2000, 323-5; under 
exceptional circumstances it could have operated more swiftly). At this rate 
it took an average of 13.1 days for information to reach Trier from Rome 
and at least 17.5 days to reach Colchester, the capital of Roman Britain.
This comparison is not meant to suggest anything about the relative 
connectivity of these two empires, but that they were at least commensu-
rate. But this commensurability has significant implications for the study 
of Achaemenid imperialism. The Roman Empire was highly centralized, 
and provincial administrators such as Pliny the Younger (d. c.113 CE) 
frequently referred matters to the emperor’s attention, even if only for 
approval after the fact; indeed, at the apogee of the empire’s size, the 
emperor had to govern largely by correspondence (Millar 2004: 23-46). 
Moreover, as studies of Romanization have shown, the empire was suffi-
ciently interconnected for there to be a significant level of cultural interac-
tion among the various social and ethnic groups that comprised its 
population. There is even debate as to the degree to which it may have 
been economically integrated. This picture of a centralized and intercon-
nected empire is very different from the typical vision of the Achaemenid 
Empire. Yet the empires had similar capacities for connectivity: either these 
differences need to be explained by something other than differences in 
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geography or the Achaemenid Empire was more centralized and more 
integrated than current assumptions allow. This comparison suggests at 
least that assumptions about the connectivity of the Roman Empire and 
the resulting research questions asked about it are applicable also to the 
Achaemenid Empire, and the onus is on scholars to demonstrate whether 
or not that is the case.
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